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PURPOSE AND INTRODUCTION 
The activities of I. G. Farbenindustrie in the United 
States/.1afforded Americans the opportunity to observe Third 
Reich activities as they existed in pre-war America. This pre-
view of Naziism in America helped unite popular opinion against 
Hitler. It is the purpose of this paper to point out the origins 
of such a system in this country, the conditions which nurtured 
its growth, characteristics of the system, and the steps which 
lead to the collapse of the system. The lack of a detai]ed and 
determined policy by the Germans prevented their utilization of 
I. G. Farbenindustrie to its upmost strategic value in the area 
of economic warfare. America, on the other hand, lacked a 
determined policy to deal with the German menace and had the 
Germans been able to follow a directed policy, it would have 
been harder for the u.s. to remove them from a strengthened 
position at a later date. 
Farben•s activities in the u.s. were of strategic, 
rather than tactical value to the Wehrmacht (German armed 
forces). Unlike Farben 1 s European factories, the factories in 
the U.S. provided Hitler with no war material; they provided a 
greater service--the prevention of production of vital commod-
ities needed by Hitler's enemies. Farben•s effect on tho u.So 
economy was restrictive and regulative, rather than open and 
1 
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contributory. The true strength of Farben•s influence on the 
American economy remained hidden until the war broke out and 
even after September, 1939, its true strengths and character-
istics were not fully understood. The passage of time has 
erased most of the emotional feelings of the war, thus permit-
ting a more meaningful study of the activities of I. G. Farben-
industrie in the U.S. from 1929 until March 11, 1942. 
A. Cartel: A definition. 
The first step to be taken in the study of a cartel, 
such as Farben, is the establishment of n good workinp definition 
of the term cartel. The League of Nations in the 1920ts addressed 
itself to the cartel problem, and after considerable deliberation, 
determined that 
cartels are associations of independent undertakings 
in the same or similar branches of industry established 
with f view to improve conditions of production and 
sale. 
This definition reflected one aspect of the Leagues naivity, 
that is, the failure or inability to realize the long-term con-
sequences that resulted from the lack of proper immediate 
corrective action. Corwin D. Edwards, the noted cartel histori-
an, described cartels as arrangements which have the purpose of 
regulating competition in international trade. 2 This definition 
will be used in all references to cartels in this paper. 
B. Farbents ~ to Prominence 
It would be difficult to begin a study of I. G. Farben-
industrie with the formal foundation of the cartel in 1925. To 
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understand the reasons for the cartel•s formation, the reader 
must know something about economic conditions which shaped pre-
war Germany. The real origins of cartels began in late 19th 
century Germany. The period of greatest German cartel growth 
was in the economically turbulent years of the 1920•s when the 
economy was subjected to frequent recessions. These economic 
upheavals encouraged, and often necessitated, the banding to-
gether of German business to eliminate competition whenever 
possible. 
When the economic distress subsided, the various 
businesses tried to disjoin themselves from the combinations 
if possible.3 The economic conditions which ushered in the 
Third Reich in 1933 sparked a renewed emphasis on cartel forma-
tion; a trend which Hitler found politically advantageous to 
encourage.4 Hitler's defacto support of cartels gave rise to 
the idea that cartels were the product of a totalitarian society 
and that totalitarianism was "the final expression of the 
reactionary forces stemming from special privilege."5 The 
period of German rearmament saw I. G. Farben and the Third 
Reich become so intermeshed that one could not exist without 
the other. The use of each by the other helped insure the 
apocalyptic events of 1939-1945. 
The unfavorable economic aonditions which followed 
WWI brought together the eight major German chemical firms in 
1925. Out of this meeting came the formation of the 
Interessengmeinshaft (the I.G. in I. G. Farben) which repre-
sented a combination of businesses involved in the chemical 
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industry. This merger marks Farben 1 s birth. 
The close association of Farben and the National 
Socialists (Nazis) began in 1932. Farben financially supported 
Hitler in return for a pledge by Hitler to establish a synthetic 
gasoline plant in Germany. Farben•s chemists had discovered the 
process of hydrogenation which allowed the Germans to extract 
petroleum products from coal, which was in great surplus in 
Germany. This process promised Germany self-sufficiency, a 
necessary condition in a future war. The program was accelerated 
in the 1933 Four Year Plan and was strengthened with the adoption 
of rearmament after 1935 which put demands upon the German petro-
leum industry. Another program, that of the development of 
synthetic rubber, was needed to supply the needs of the Wehrmacht. 
Soon, goals of self-sufficiency in gasoline and rubber became 
important. Germany zealously guarded the secrets of synthetic 
product, giving nothing away that would jeopardize German econo-
mic monopoly. The German foreign trade policy from 1935 to 1939 
was frequently subjected to policy reversals. Continuity of a 
foreign trade policy was subordinated to the rearmament program. 
Such a conflict over rearmament arose between Reichsbankdirektor 
Schacht who favored a reduction in arms spending to offset in-
f " lation and Reichspresident·Goring who urged (in 1937) that the 
entire economy be placed in a state of "readiness for war within 
four years."6 The Schact-G8ring controversy continued for 
several years, eliminating any possibility of a directed policy 
on a long-term basis. 
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The strategic value of foreign exchange was realized 
by all, but not with uniform and continued attempts to make 
good use of this scanty "raw material." The continually shift-
ing currents of thought about what to do with German assets 
abroad wrecked havoc with the exchange program. General foreign 
exchange control was exercised by four agencies.7 
Reich Ministry of Economics (ultimate control) 
Reichsbank 
Foreign Exchange Officer 
Supervisory Activities Board 
The desire to control foreign trade resulted in the 
creation of the Wehrwirtschaft sot'ab (M11i tary Economic Staff} 
in 1935 which approved all cartel arrangements, domestic and 
foreign.8 The Amnesty Act of 1936 required all Germans to 
register their non-German property with the Reich and further 
required the immediate conversion of foreign exchange into German 
Reichmarks (RMs).9 The Amnesty Act provided the Reich with a 
complete listing of all foreign properties outside of Germany 
which were subject to liquidation or transfer at a later date. 
The small amount of foreign exchange which flowed into Germany 
demanded strict regulation of foreign movies available in trade; 
the Wehrwirtschaftsotab and the Amnesty Act are only two examples 
of regulatory measures. Bad feelings soon developed between 
those persons whose properties faced liquidation and the Reich 
Ministry of Economics (which carried out liquidation.) The 
cost of rearmament demanded the liquidation of many minor pro-
perties abroad. It was decided (in 1937) that assets not 
nabsolutely indispensable for the maintenance of German foreign 
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trade."lO In general, the major businesses and industries re-
mained intact.11 
The need for economic espionage is present in the world 
of business is always present and Farben developed a refined 
intelligence system in the early 1930•s. Farben instituted the 
VOWI (the Statistical Department) which kept Farben (and later, 
the Reich) informed of economic advances in other countries.12 
The Wehrmacht, realizing the value of economic intelligence, 
organized its own economic intelligence branch, the Vermillurg-
stelle w, to coordinate the various economic intelligence systems, 
including Farben•s. VOWI operated without much of the bureaucra-
tic red tape of Reich organizations and reached the peak of its 
activities in 1937-1938. With the outbreak of war in Poland, 
VOWI became the unofficial center for many Nazi intelligence 
systems. The excellence of its work prevented its merger into 
the intelligence system of the OKW (Army Supreme Cornmand).13 
The Reich officials were smart enough not to tamper with this 
efficient, functioning system. 
Farben•s overseas representatives were both skilled 
businessmen and disciplined Nazi party members. Each man re-
ceived intensive indoctrination and was a member of the German 
Labor Front (a Reich "union•t of workers, both white and blue 
collar varieties) and each was aware that it was "their special 
duty to represent National Socialist Germany. 1114 With business-
men skilled in commerce and persuasion, it is small wonder that 
Farben reached a commanding position in world trade. 
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c. Farben's Policy Regarding America 
The loss of Germany's position as a favored nation in 
1936-1937 further complicated the formation of a workable foreign 
policy. Prior to 1936, Schacht endeavored to reduce friction 
between the U.S. and Germany in the foreign trade field. Schacht 1 s 
II fall from power in late 1937 enabled Goring to follow a harder. 
line in regards to American trade, and foreign trade in general. 
An attempt at moderation was made in 1938 with the personal visit 
of Reichsbankdirektor Brinkmann to the U.S. He referred to trade 
relations between the two nations as "the pivot of the entire 
German trade policy, or even our general economic policy. 111 .5 His 
personal mission failed due in part to adverse effect of the 
German occupation of Prague. 
The following year, 1939, revealed the threat of a 
trade war between the u.s. and Germany. The fear soon passed 
and German foreign trade policy entered a new phase prior to 
1939, the Germans had considered their assets in America as "a 
1.6 bond between the two countries." The policy of the early 
part of 1939 which favored liquidation now shifted to cloaking 
of German assets by the summer of the same year. It appears 
strange that the Germans, in the pre-war years favored liquida-
tion and when war approached, the emphasis was placed on 
cloaking. The Germans certainly underestimated the scope and 
duration of WW II. 
D. Wartime Measures 
A directive from the Reich Ministry of Economics .(RME) 
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dated September 9, 1939, dealt with the protection of German 
foreign assets and German trade with neutral countries. 17 The 
author of this directive, Dr. Gustav Schlotterer as chief of 
the Export Department called for the innnediate transfer of 
titles of German properties to friendly neutral aliens.18 The 
responsibility for all cloaking (concealment of apparent German 
control) arrangements was with the parent company. In spite of 
the lateness of such an order, (which points up a lack of co-
ordination between the OKW and the RME) the parent company was 
held responsible for all actions of its satellite enterprises. 
Cloaking measures involved various schemes which transferred 
stock ownership to friendly aliens or dunnny stockholders, stock 
transfers between German and neutral companies and the apparent 
wholesale selling of German properties when the Germans secretly 
controlled vital business functions. 19 No matter what method 
was used, there was considerable German reliance on the good 
faith of the aliens who participated in the cloaking schemes. 
The outbreak of war caused a disruption in Farben's 
role as a worldwide supplier of chemicals and dyestuffs. Prior 
to the Polish war, Farben accounted for almost 49% of the worldts 
chemical sales abroad while the u.s. in comparison, provided 
20 
only 20.7% of the world's sales. The competition for Latin 
American markets was strong, but very lopsided. Sales figures 
for 1938 show that Farben provided 59.9% of Latin America's 
chemical purchases while the u.s. only provided 10.6% of the 
sales.21 German trade arrangements with American chemical 
9 
companies resulted in the virtual exclu~ion of American chemicals 
from Latin America. The British blockade of Germany failed to 
halt the shipment of Farbents goods abroad. Farbenrs sales in 
1940 show that sales in the amount of 4,005,925 RM (1 RM = $0.40) 
were shipped through such neutral areas as Holland, Italy, and 
22 Siberia to Latin American markets for the most part. These 
goods, when not shipped in neutral ship3, employed the inter-
national postal services, cargo submarines and blockade runners. 23 
Farben went to great lengths to provide for and protect her Latin 
American markets. 
The German foreign trade policy of the 1930'n was at 
most times confused, and at times, nonexistent. The changes of 
policy (liquidation and cloaking) represented the instability 
present in the upper levels of the Retch. These personality con-
flicts prevented the implementation of a single determined policy, 
and when war broke out, there was a great rush to institute n 
solid and feasible policy for foreign trade and assets. The 
transition could not be made smoothly, nor in time. Farben was 
able to see what was happening, and within the framework of the 
public policy on foreign activities, made some arrangements for 
the future which will be discussed later. Farben•s activities 
from 1926 to 1939 can be sunmied up as "one of genius, not bur-
dened with ethical conscience." 24 
CHAPTER I 
FOR¥illTION OF THE FARBEN EMPIRE IN AMERICA 
A. Activities in ~he Post-~ Decade 
The close of \I'w I saw the U.S. government in control 
of all former German properties in America. The sale of con-
fiscated German chemical corporations was a move to destroying 
remaining German influence on the chemical industry. The German 
pharmaceutical grant, Bayer, was sold to Sterling Products, Inc. 
who later sold certain portions of Bayer to the American company, 
Grasselli Chemical. In 1923, Bayer of Germany and Grasselli 
formed a joint chemical company in America under the Grasselli 
name and also formed General Dyestuff Corporation (GDC) to market 
the products. Grasselli sold its former Bayer dyestuffs holdings 
to I. G. Farbenindustrie and all other interests to du Pont on 
October 20, 1928. This transfer marks the re-establishment of 
the German Chemical Industry in America, in less than ton years 
after the Armistice, had regained tho dye business which it had 
lost by confiscation. 25 
The following year, 1929, saw the formal merger of all 
of Farben 1s American holdings with the formation of the American 
I. G. Chemical Corporation, essentially a holding company com-
26 posed of the following holdings. 
General Aniline (formerly. Grasselli Dyes) 
Agfa-Ansco 
50% interest in Winthrop Chemical Corporation 
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50% interest in Magnesium Development Corporation 
The company listed its two-fold objectives on its Certificate 
of Incorporation filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1929. The corporation sought to foster and finance 
development of chemical industries in the U.S. and elsewhere, 
and secondly, to enter into any and all agreements deemed 
necessary for the benefit of the corporation. 27 This drive 
for economic supremacy, as mentioned in the objectives, was the 
key theme of all of Farben's activities with other businesses; 
Farben (and later, the Reich) were to be strengthened at the 
expense of others. 
B. Activities of the Pre-war Decade 
The direct Berlin control of I. G. Farben over American 
I.G. was well concealed from all non-Farben personnel. The 
board of directors included both Germans and Americans. American 
members of the board included Edsel Ford and Walter Teagle (a 
former president of Standard Oil of New Jersey). Many of the 
members of the board were members of the companies associated 
with American I. G. The election of Teagle to the board in 1929 
followed a marketing agreement between Farben and Standard Oil 
in which American I. G. gained the services of Teagle and a 
quantity of Standard Oil stock. So well concealed was the 
Berlin control, that Walter Teagle sincerely pleaded before a 
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation of American 
I. G. that he did not know who really controlled American r. G. 28 
The main products produced by American I. G. (and later, 
General Aniline) were coal for dyes, chemicals, medicines, 
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cameras, film, and other photographic supplies. The firm of 
Agfa-Ansco was one of American r. G.•s better known companies. 
The economic power of American r. G. was able to increase in 
the Depression years. The areas of concentration by American 
r. G. and Farben will be separately covered in a following 
chapter. 
The outbreak of the war in Europe made it necessary 
for American I. G. to change its name to n less Germon sounding 
title. The change became formal on October 30, 1939, due to be-
29 lief that German names caused prejudice in this country. 
Another important development prompted by the rise of 
tensions in the late l930•s was Farben•s use an American company, 
Chemnyco Inc., as its technological link to Farbenrs American 
enterprises. Farben went to considerable trouble and expense 
to maintain Chemnyco•s services in the economic intelligence 
field. Not all German officials involved in economic espionage 
were in agreement to the value of Chomnycors services; consider-
able correspondence between Farben and RME disclose a reluctance 
to release funds to pay for Chemnycors services. The company 
gained unwanted publicity when Rudolf Ilger, the vice president, 
ordered the company's files burned.30 In normal times, such an 
action might have passed without much concern, but not in the 
midst of the U.S. government's investigation of the company•s 
activities. This did not improve Farben•s image in America. 
The company was paid $16,000 per month for its economic espion-
age activities. Farben summed up Chemnycors services in a 
letter to RHE dated August 3, 1940: 
1. it provided "voluminous information on 
American industry, 
2. it served as an agent in negotiations for 
American use of Farben 1 s patents, 
3. was tied to Magnesium Development Corpora-
tion ~fd the American Magnesium Corpora-
tion. 
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Chemnyco continued its services to Farben even though Farben, due 
to problems within RME or U.S. legal actions against Farben, was 
unable to pay. Chemnyco amassed credits with Farben, hoping to 
be paid in the future. 
A study of the actual stock ownership of General Aniline 
will show undeniable German ownership. The 1940 Annual Report 
of General Aniline on file at the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission shows that the Farben sponsored Swiss corporation 
Internationale Gesellschaft filrChemishe Unternehmungen (I. G. 
Chemie) controlled 77.76% of the General Aniline stock.32 
Common A stock 
388,816 shares 
66, 632 shares 
176 :!!hares 
Common B. stock 
650,000 
600,000 
300,000 
500,000 
I. G. Chemie 
Osmon A. G. 
not disclosed 
L. D. Pickering & Co. 
Chemo Maatschappi 
N. V. Maatschappi 
Banque Federale 
31.71% 
29.27% 
14. 63% 
24.39% 
The blocks of stock held by the Maatschappi companies had been 
"transferred" to I. G. Chemie after the fall of Holland. L. D. 
Pickering & Co. was an American investment house which handled 
Farben's American securities. The Treasury Department in the 
fall of 1940 refused to recognize the transfer of the Maatschappi 
stock to I. G. Chemie. This was one of the earliest strong 
economic measures taken against Farben to date by the U.S. 
government. The actual ownership of General Aniline stock 
shows undeniable German control of the company. 
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General Aniline, like I. G. Chemie, was a holding 
company. The 1940 Annual Report lists General Anilina•s hold-
ings with a value of $10,880,860 with major holdings in Standard 
Oil ($6,979,946), Sterling Products Inc. ($2,424,320) and du Pont 
($899,250).33 The holdings represented a considerable investment 
in pre-war America. 
Stock manipulations were not limited to international 
transactions; the attempts by certain American r. G. executives 
to gain control of General Dyestuff Corporation added to Farben•s 
problems of maintaining its economic empire. The key to control 
of General Dyestuff was the stock option clause inserted by I. G. 
Farben when GDC became associated with American I. G. The sales 
of stock were controlled by an option device which specified 
that each stockholder must sell his holdings to the option holder 
at the option price of $100 per share, plus a 6% dividend payable 
from the date of the last announced dividena.34 After a long 
series of manipulations, the option came to Chenmyco ard D. A. 
Scblntz, the leading Chemnyco stockholder. His plans for control 
of GDC were thwarted by the shift of German foreign assets policy 
which called for cloaking rather than liquidation. His plans to 
gain a quick profit before liquidation (which never came) were 
demolished by the policy change. He received orders from Farben 
15 
to sell his stock valued at $460 (on the open markot) and had 
to resign from the board at General Aniline. After the fall of 
D. A. Sch:lntz, GDC was able to purchase some of its own stock 
which removed considerable foreign control.35 The cloaking 
program was speeded up after May, 1940, with the revamping of 
the I. G. Farben, I. G. Chemie, and General Aniline rolutionship. 
It called for an increase in the use of American personnel and 
the elimination of some of the more obvious association of I. G. 
Chemie and General Aniline which antagonized many Americans.36 
Farben generally turned a deaf ear to General Aniline•s requests 
for cloaking measures.37 The Reich Ministry of Economics 
created a Transaction Section to deal with the necessary 
Americanization of German firms. This section, under the 
directorship of Ministerialrat Imhoff never lived up to expecta-
tions .38 It was hoped that American fears about German firms 
in America would subside. Farben soon found out that they had 
underestimated the American public. 
CHAPTER II 
FARBEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 
Farben's areas of participation in the American economy 
show wise foresight and strategic planning. Farben 1 s participa-
tion was regulative rather than contributive in its position to 
the economy; it exerted great concealed pressure upon direction 
from Berlin as in the case of synthetic. Farben's rise to 
importance in the U.S. was not accomplished overnight; it was 
the product of years of scheming and negotiations. The result 
of such actions was not really felt until the war in Europe 
threatened to embroil America. The effects of Farben's control 
were, at the best, generally short-term and overcome by a 
directed effort of a united nation in war. 
Farbcn's American activities can be broken down into 
four main areas: pharmaceuticals, light weight metals, synthe-
tic gasoline, and synthetic rubber. The strategic advantage 
(or more correctly, the lack) of the use of such products in 
wartime is beyond doubt; Farben attempted to deny tho United 
States and her allies the use of these vital materials. 
1. Pharmaceuticals - Farbenis pharmaceutical sales 
in the u.s. were handled by General Aniline through the Winthrop 
Company. General Aniline owned 50% of the Winthrop preferred 
stock with a value of $125,00o. 39 Winthrop operated under a 
16 
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Farben license to manufacture pharmaceuticals products, veteri-
nary remedies, and insecticides. The territorial limitations, 
for sale of products, were limited to the continental U.S., 
Canada, and the American possessions.4° Winthrop chemical con-
trolled the below listed companies.41 
H. A. Metz Laboratories 
Drug Inc. 
United Drug Inc. 
Antidolnr Manufacturing Company 
Sterling Products Inc. 
The British blockade of Germany resulted in the re-definition 
of sales territory. With r. G. Farben unable to supply the 
pharmaceutical needs of Latin America, Parben 1 s American com-
panies were pressed into service to fill the void. These 
companies directly aided Germany by their sale of pharmacouti-
cals to Latin America in containers which beared a strong re-
semblance to former German packages.42 This fraudulent marketing 
had the advantage of appearing to reduce the blockade of Germany. 
Farbents sales and production of pharmaceuticals were of minor 
importance when compared to her other activities. The chief 
value of Farben•s pharmaceutical activit:tes lay in its advantage 
to supplement German drug trade. When the u.s. and Great Britain 
realized what Farben was doing, both nations eventually ended 
this trade, thus ending any advantage formerly enjoyed. 
2. Light Weight Metals - Farben, in the 1920 1 s and 
1930•s, was able to profit from the American competition between 
the established aluminum industry and its infant rival industry, 
magnesium. From 1919 to 1927, Dow Chemical and the American 
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Magnesium Corporation (AHC) as a subsidiary of the Aluminum 
Company of America (Alcoa) enjoyed the distinction of being the 
only producers of domestic magnesium. The interest of the 
aluminum companies in magnesium were ones geared to the dis-
placement of aluminum by its long feared replacement, magnesium. 
American thinking in this decade was p~ared to the thought of 
complete supremacy in the industries; there was no chance for 
peaceful co-existence between the two metals. In 1927, AMC 
ceased production of magnesium, giving Dow a monopoly. Alcoa 
became indirectly involved in the aluminum cartel when her 
subsidiary, Alted, joined the cartel. Thus, Alcoa gained some 
benefits (guaranteed minimum prices, exclusive marketing terri-
tories, etc.) from Altedts participation. 
In 1931, Farben, as the chief producer of magnesium 
in Germany, entered into an agreement with Alcoa known as the 
Alig Agreement. A joint corporation, Magnesium Development 
Corporation (MDC), was formed to supervise the exchange of 
magnesium patents between the two sponsors. Farben received 
a 50% interest in Alcoa's American Magnesium Corporation. Al-
coa•s interests in the agreement were two-fold.43 First, 
Alcoa hoped to secure a powerful position in the rival magnesium 
industry, and second, the agreement prevented Farben from 
licensing other American firms to produce magnesium. Production 
of American magnesium was set at the low figure of 4,000 tons 
yearly.41+ 
Dow Chemical entered into a patent cross-licensing 
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agreement with MDC on January 1, 1934.45 Dow concluded another 
agreement which secured Farben as Dows chief magnesium custo-
mer. 46 The agreement allowed for token shipments to Gr~at 
Britain. In the first two years, Dow sold 3.8 million (out of 
a total production of 4.0 million) pounds of aluminum to 
Farben. Due to Farben's preferential customer status, sho 
paid 30% less per pound than regular customera.47 
These agreements fell into disuse after 1938 when 
Germany accelerated her magnesium production while the other 
nations produced the metal at cartel's assigned figures. The 
effect of such arbitrary regulation was not really felt until 
the U.S. entered; and then, the effects were all too visible. 
Defense readiness had been subordinated to the selfish interests 
of the aluminum interests.48 Farben had developed a domestic 
competition into a virtual monopoly, a tribute to German know-
how and American shortsightedness. 
3. Synthetic Gasoline - Discovery of the hydrogena-
tion process by Farben chemists in 1926 thundered both political 
and economic triumphs of the first magnitude.49 Large scale 
production of synthetic gasoline from coal via the hydrogenation 
process threatened to upset Standard Oita virtual control of 
petroleum production. On the other hand, the discovery promised 
to make Germany self-sufficient in gasoline in a future war, a 
long-cherished dream. On November 9, 1929, the full marriage 
of Farben and Standard Oil secured Standard's position in the 
oil industry with the exception of Farben's production of 
German gasoline. This Division of Fields Agreement secured 
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Farben•s position in the chemical field worldwide. The Four 
party Agreement called for the creation of a joint corporation, 
Standard r. G., to exchange processing petroleum secrets as 
specified in the Division of Fields Agreement. Standard Oil 
gained 80% control of Standard r. G.5° The joint American 
Study Group Company was another company that was formed in the 
1929 agreements, founded to develop chemical processes not 
51 included in the Four Party Agreement. Farben and Standard 
were equal partners in Jasco, but the majority of work was 
done in Standard•s plants. The Division of Fields and the 
Four Party Agreements had the effect of insur·ing Standard 1 s 
position outside of Germany but at the cost of retarding any 
future serious work in related fields, especially in the field 
of synthetic rubber. 
Farben, in 1937, undertook to purchase $20 million 
worth of aviation gasoline and lubricants from the U.S. Farben 
secured the necessary petroleum products in the u.s., but did 
not purchase directly from Standard Oil; Standard did, however, 
underwrite Farben 1 s agreements with the American suppliers. 
Farben secured the necessary funds from the Reich government 
and received no profits for its services;52 Farben felt that 
it was their moral obligation to help supply Germany's petro-
leum needs until plants for synthetic gasoline could be built.53 
Farben made another petroleum purchase in America in 1938. 
Farben secured 500 tons of tetraethyl lead (a necessnry chemical 
used in the production of high-octane aviation gasoline) from 
the Ethyl Export Corporation, an American firm. The agreement 
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called for Farben to borrow the necessary chemical after posting 
a collateral of $900 1 000.54 Again, Standard Oil gave its 
support to this transaction and the bargain was concluded. After 
the tetraethyl lead was delivered, Farben notified the Ethyl 
Export Corporation of its voluntary forfeiture of the posted 
bond. This good bargain illustrates Farbents use of business 
associations to aid the needs of the German war machine. 
4. Synthetic Rubber - The development of synthetic 
rubber (buna) was high on the list of national objectives of the 
German. Rubber represented the weakest link in the Gorman war 
machine; her enemies, Great Britain, France, and the u.s., con-
trolled the world's supply of natural rubber. The knowledge 
that any fUture war would end German imports of natural rubber, 
and the problems arising from the lack of rubber, prompted 
Germany to seek a domestic source of rubber. The 1929 agree-
ments with Standard Oil gave Farben the go-ahead to develop 
synthetic rubber alone; Standard Oil could do only smallscale 
experimental work with Farben's permission. Farben, as a re-
sult of the high priority of synthetic rubber development, 
could release very few secrets to Standard without finding 
itself in serious trouble.55 From 1930 to 1938, Standard Oil 
developed its own buna, Butyl, and gave fully detailed informa-
tion to Farben through Jasco as specified in the 1929 agree-
ments.56 
The synthetic rubber situation became somewhat more 
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complicated when Goodyear applied for a Farben license in 1937 
to produce Farben buna in the U.S. Farben turned down Goodyear's 
request stating that American buna and production techniques 
were inferior to Farbenrs and that Farben was prohibited by the 
Reich government from granting licenses to non-German companies.57 
Farbents American patents on their Buna S and Buna N did not ex-
pire until 1950 and 1951 and these patents gave Farben exclusive 
control of buna production in America. 58 
Rejected by Farben, Goodyear made considerable progress 
in experimental research and even had plans of competing with 
Standard's Butyl in the future if there was a way to circumvent 
Farben 1 s control.59 The big change in Farben's policy came 
after September, 1939, when Farben permitted Standard Oil to 
license companies to produce Farben buna. There were consider-
able stipulations attached which enabled Standard to purchase 
up to 75% of Farben buna produced by the other companies, the 
papnent of a high royality to Standard Oil of 75¢ per pound, 
and a written understanding that any technological advances 
made by the licenses would become exclusive property of Standard 
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and Farben. It is rather easy to see how synthetic rubber 
production in the u.s. was severely retarded. It is interest-
ing to note that there was somewhat of rivalr-J between the 
propanets of natural and synthetic rubber (analogous to the 
aluminum-magnesium controversy) and that this inability to co-
exist caused problems in later years. America, unlike Germany, 
failed to realize the consequences of being denied a ready 
source of natural rubber as was the case in early 1942. This 
failure was overcome only by a determined and united effort 
by American industry in 1942. Farben's ability to utilize 
American business competition to benefit the war machines of 
Nazi Germany is a monument to German efficiency. 
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CHAPTER III 
DISSOLUTION OF THE FARBEN EMPIRE IN AMEBICA 
The breakup of Farbents economic empire was a long 
overdue action. The American public was almost inconceivably 
unaware of the extent of German control of American industry 
and this had the effect of creating a minor flood of muckraking 
journalism. The extent of foreign control pointed up the need 
for more government regulation of the economy. It is possible 
to breakdown in terms of actions taken by the u.s. government. 
A. Investigation of Farben Beg!!,!! 
The U.S. Senate took steps to attack the cartel problem 
by the appointment of a subcommittee to investigate the "degree 
of German control of industries essential to defense through 
61 patent pools and other arrangements." This subcommittee, 
formed on January 4, 1941, was headed up by Senator Wheeler. 
The investigation was prompted by problems in securing certain 
materials (optical goods and plexiglass to name two) that were 
used in Lend Lease shipments to Great Britain. Gorman patents 
on these products enabled the Germans to effectively curtail 
Lend Lease shipments to England. 
Senator 0 •Hahoney, chairman of the Temporary National 
Economic· Committee (TNEC), opened the controversy in the light 
metals industry. TNEC, beginning in 1939, began to study 
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concentrations of economic power in the u.s. The committee 
reported on domestic monopolies in many segments of the 
American economy. O•Mahoney lashed out at Alcoa for its 
entering into agreements with Farben to secure use of Farben•s 
patents. He felt that Hitler would soon be producing a billion 
pounds of aluminum yearly in comparison to America•s production 
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of 327 million pounds per year. A federal court in New York 
returned an indictment against six companies with antitrust 
violations. Companies nruned were Alcoa, Magnesium Development 
Corporation, Dow Chemical, General Aniline, and I. G. Farben-
industrie. It was revealed that Germany purchased magnesium 
for 21~ per pound while American purchasers paid 30~ per pound. 
President Roosevelt, upon hearing of the price differences, re-
marked that "the government had a right to take over any plant, 
American or foreign. 1163 Note the shift in emphasis from alumi-
num to magnesium. 
Arthur Davis of Alcoa led seven individuals into 
court on February 6, 1941, and all pleaded "not guil tyn to 
64 charges of conspiracy with I. G. Farben. General Aniline 
went unrepresented at the hearing until Karl Hockswenter, a 
company representative, entered a "not guilty" plea for himself. 
He made no plea for the company. Federal Judge Alfred c. Coxe 
entered a "not guilty" plea for General Aniline. 
The most important single person in the breakup of 
Farben was the Assistant Attorney General, Thurman w. Arnold, 
of the Antitrust Division. This Harvard trained lawyer was 
instrumental in securing convictions, especially Farben' s. 
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He knew how to apply all forms of pressure to the involved 
companies to secure the truth about their dealings. It was 
said of his trustbusting skill, "It was really simple, and 
Thurman perfected the method if he did not invent it. 1165 In 
future cases, Arnold used all forms of mass media to encourage 
public opinion against the cartels and to urge patent law re-
forms and stricter antitrust measures. He mot with considerable, 
but not complete, success in the following year. 
The Justice Department, under the supervision of 
Arnold, opened its investigation of German control on April 10, 
1941. The government subpoenaed the company records of General 
Aniline, Sterling Products, and Winthrop Chemical Company. The 
indictment alleged restraint of commerce as specified in the 
66 Sherman Antitrust Act. Attached to each subpoena was a list 
of 100 corporations and a court order for each company to re-
port any transactions with the listed companies (which were 
German controlled). 67 Schering Corporation, subpoenaed earlier, 
went on record that "not one per cent of its South American 
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sales profits go to Germany, either directly or indirectly." 
The validity of this statement was questionable. The investi-
gation had the value of showing the extent of German penetra-
tion into the South American drug market. 
The British Economic Warfare Ministry under Hugh 
Dalton announced, in the beginning of May, 1941, that General 
Aniline, Sterling Products, and Schering Corporation were 
German controlled. The report requested the U.S. government 
to freeze all German assets. 69 
B. Freezing of German Funds 
The government ordered the seizure of the funds of 
General Aniline on deposit in the National City Bank of Now 
York in an attempt to force the Germans to appear at the 
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magnesium investigation. The order was issued on May 10; the 
investigation began in January. In the seizure order, Attorney 
General Jackson called Farben 11 probably the most powerful 
single influence in American industry."70 
The sinking of the U.S. destroyer Robin Moor in the 
middle of June gave FDR the opportunity to issue his freezing 
order of June 14. There was much speculation about government 
actions in regards to German patent rights and many hoped that 
the patents would also be frozen.71 Attorney General Jackson 
estimated that German and Italian assets in the U.S. had a 
value in excess of $30q million. Considerable concern was 
expressed over reported Swiss holdings in excess of C1.5 
billion. 72 It was realized that much of that sum represented 
cloaked German holdings which did not fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Freezing Order. 
The government gained a victory on September 5, 1941, 
when Acting Attorney General Biddle announced that Sterling 
Products, Bayer, and Alba Pharmaceuticals were enjoined in a 
73 consent decree from association with I. G. Farben. The 
consent decree was the result of the investigation of South 
American drug sales by Farben's u.s. associates. 
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c. General Aniline's Antitrust Case 
The final and most important court case against Farben 
in 1941 was the case involving General Aniline. General Aniline, 
realizing that they would have to appear in court at some future 
date, attempted some belated corrective measures. A high level 
executive shake-up ousted D. A. Schintz as president and elected 
his successor, John E. Mack. 74 The Americans had gainro con-
siderable control on the board of directors and were making 
moves to prevent the collapse of the company from a federal 
take over. In the middle of October, the government announced 
its plans to investigate General Aniline. 
The Americans on the board at General Aniline elected 
William C. Bullit to the board during the absence of the German 
directors, D. A. Schintz, Dro Ernest Schwartz, and Felix 
Iselin. 75 The election of Bullit, a personal friend of FDR, 
was hoped to reduce the government•s contention that the firm 
was openly German. This relief was short-lived, lasting until 
the war broke out. Two days after the declaration of war by 
Germany, the Treasury Department stationed 17 agents on the 
76 General Aniline premises to insure stability. 
On December 20, the government announced that General 
Aniline had been indicted on 3 antitrust violations. Antitrust 
indictments were also returned against the brothers Schintz, 
Ernest Schwartz, and w. H. vom Rath. 7? General Aniline and her 
German directors pleaded "not guilty." Joseph O'Connell of the 
Treasury Department's Foreign Funds Control Division barred the 
indicted directors from the company's premises.78 The barred 
men were labeled "personifications of I. G. Farben. 1179 The 
government asked for, and received, a postponement of the 
trial proceedings to further develop their case. 
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Secretary of the Treasilry, !·!01~ gan thau, anr.ounced thr.. t 
the February 16th seizure of G8neral Aniline's stock h&d netted 
95c of the common and preferred stock and disclosed that 95r;!. of 
the company's debentures were owned by Americans. General 
Aniline mi8ht have been controlled by the Germans but the 
company's debt was owned by Americans. He said that the action 
was only temporary and that "the question of ultimate disposi-
tion is left open. 1180 This seizure was supposed to relieve the 
"mental hardship 11 borne by the An:erican directors who wore later 
reduced in number from 12 to 4. 81 Robert McConnell was chosen 
to head the company as its new president. 82 
D. Creation of the Office of Alien PropertL Custodian (OAPC) 
The Office of Alien Property Custodian was created on 
83 Harch 11, 1942, as defined in &ecutive Order N. 9095. The 
Trading }nth the Enemy Act of 1917 had set up a similnr body to 
deal with enemy property during ·ww I and Fxecuti ve Order N. 9095 
made changes to facilitate the activities of the 1942 OAPc. 84 
The creation of this office did not terminate the Treasury De-
partment 1 s dealings with enemy property; it merely created a 
division of authorities. The Treasury Department had sought 
to control theenemyts general purchasing power to prevent its 
use for purposes contrary to the interests of the United 
States. 85 The OAPC dealt with real property and sou8ht to 
remove any potential misuse of property and the prohibition 
of all tllllicensed communications by the enemy. 86 
The OAPC exercised three forms of control: the 
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vesting order which gave the Custodian title to enemy proper-
ties, the supervisory order which called for government super-
vision of a business, and a general order which required 
87 
specific persons to perform certain actions. 
Property controlled by OAPC was valued in excess of 
$7 billion which made Custodian Leo T. Crowley a very rich man, 
88 
at least on paper. This figure included all alien property 
which came under OAPC control; the value of rmerrl-y property was 
$456 million. The Germans after 191~1 disagreed over the value 
of their now confiscated holdings, a paper by the Reichbank 
gave three figures on the value of assets in America, ranging 
from $15,747,000 to 077,000,000 dependinB on the agency compil-
ing the report. 89 The paper's only comment about the incon-
sistency was "but again, there is no way of verifying their 
correctness. 1190 Actual German assets in the u.s. amounted to 
$105 million9l while U.S. investments in Germany were in ex-
92 
cess of $420 million. 
E. The Standard Oil Controversy 
The government opened its attack on Standard Oil on 
Earch 26, 1942, statin~ conspiracy with I. G. Farben. The 
charges and countercharges show an honest difference of opinion. 
Standard argued that she had gained valuable secrets 
from Farben, citing them in the December 25, 1942 issue of 
?etroleum Times. 93 Standard declared that she had gained 
knowledge of the production of toluol, used in TNT, by the 
hydrogenation process. Standard also declared that Oppanol, 
nn additive to maintain constant lubrtcant viscosity was a 
secret gained from Farben. Standard argued that all these 
developments had aided the American war effort. 
The men at Farben had also read the Petroleum Times 
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article. They called it ''another defense arainst accusations 
that AMerica had come off badly as a result of the cooperation 
between Standard Oil and Farben. 11 94 Farben named three reasons 
for association with Standard. Standard had specialized petro-
leum experience not available in Germany, Farben wanted no un-
necessary competition in tho petroleum business in Germany, 
and lastly, that work done at Standard would not have to bo 
duplicated by Farben. They concluded that the U.S. gained no 
real secrets from Farben. 9S 
II August von Knieriem, a defendant at the Nurenberg 
Trials com.~ented on the American methods of resolving the 
Standard Oil-Farben controversy. 
These reproaches against Standard Oil were 
raised in a civilized form of a hearing before a 
Senate Committee. But now imnr-ine the situation 
of a German firm in 1944 before the neople's Cougt. 
I don 1 t believe I need say any more about that.~ 
The demands of the war eventually caused the government to 
postpone most of its proceedings to insure Standard~ full 
attention to war production. 
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F. The Controversy Continued 
The magazines of the poriod Datd considerable attention 
to the problem of foreign control. Thurman Arnold pleaded for 
changes in the patent system. In tho Atlantic Monthly, he said 
that the then present patent system repressed new inventions, 
and sought stricter supervision of patents to prevent foreign 
97 
control of U.S. patents. Lawrence Langer, a former secretary 
of the National Inventors Council, took issue over Arnold•s 
proposed patent changes. He felt that if a person refused to 
license his patent (Arnold wanted no exclusive control of a 
patent by a single company), that he would be labeled a criminal 
according to Arnold•s definition. 98 There was no simple, uni-
versally acceptable solution although some of Arnold's measures 
were adopted. 
The case of J. R. Bonnar v. U.S. in the U.S. Court of 
Claims is an attempt by one person to question the wartime 
seizure of General Dyestuff Corporation stock by the U.S. govern-
ment. This case shows us in 1969 that we are a product of the 
past. Examination of the records and exhibits of that case 
have made this paper possible and did much to stir interest in 
Farb en. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
This study of Farben's activities in the United States 
allows a comparison of the state of the art of economic warfare 
as it existed in the 1930's. This very real aspect of total 
W.) .. ~' 
war,not fully appreciated by the Germans who created it, or 
., 
the Americans who felt the effects of it. The short term 
effects of Farben's activities were very real: the retardation 
of American industries in vital areas.99 Tho only reason 
American companies entered into cartel arrangements with Farben 
was for their economic advancement. In the over-all view[ the 
price paid by America was far in excess of what she received; 
the u.s. could have developed the various Farben processes in 
due time and it should be quite apparent that Germany did not 
disclose anything of absolute necessity. 100 
The blame for the growth of Farben in this country lay 
with the American people and their government; maintenance of 
the status quo and fear of rocking the economic boat are to 
blame. q, The U.S. made attempts to extra.cti itself from the 
grasp of Farben only when she saw the true meaning and objec-
tives of Farben. The activities of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee, beginning at the turn of the decade were 
• 
worthy undertakings but the real problem was not tackled 
Until 1941.lOl Th U S h d d 1 e • • a goo egal weapons to fight the 
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problem. The Sherman Antitrust Act, if properly enforced, 
had considerable power. The lack of initial response to the 
cartel problem cannot be attributed to the act's power, but 
in the persons who used it. 
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The Germans, on the other hand, eventually lost every-
thing through human error. The lack of a consistent foreign 
economic policy lost Germany everything. Without a long-term 
economic program on the national level, Farben could hardly be 
expected to make any strategic decisions. Farben's decisions 
were generally sound and demonstrated economic genius. Ameri-
can•s must share their thanks for the fall of Farben between 
determined American efforts and blundering on the part of 
Nazi economic strategists. 
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